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ABSTRACT
In the last twenty years the labor forceparticipation rates of
45 to 54—year—old men have fallen 10.6percentage points among non—whites
and 4.4 percentage points among whites. I find thatnearly half of this
puzzling decline can be explained by the growth of the SocialSecurity
Disability program. By 1975, 6.22% of the prime—age non—whitemen and
3.57% of the white men were Social Security Disabilitybeneficiaries.
Despite the medical screening of applicants, I find in cross—section
estimates an elasticity of .35 for beneficiary status withrespect to
benefit levels. As eligibility requirements have eased andas benefit
levels have increased relative to earnings more men havedropped out of







In 1977 about one out of every five non—white 45 to 54—year old men were
out of the labor force during a typical week, Ofthese,about one—third were
SocialSecurity Disability beneficiaries. Over the past two decades the labor
force participation rates of these prime—age males have fallen 4.4percentage
pointsamong whites and 10.6 percentage points among non—whites. At the sane
time, an increasing proportion of these men have become Social Security Disa-
bility (SSD) beneficiaries (see Figure 1). Why are an increasing number of
prime age men without a job and not looking for work? Why are so many of them
becoming SSLJ beneficiaries?
I shall show that the liberalization of SSD eligibility requirements and
the increases in SSD benefits relative to potential labor market earnings have
caused more men to drop out of the labor force and become SSD beneficiaries.
The liberalization of SSD benefits can account for nearly one—half of the
puzzlingdecline in the labor force participation rates (LFPR) of 45 to 54—year
old men over the past twenty years. Unlike other forms of social insurance,
policyin the SSD program is explicitly predicated on the assumption that bene-
ficiaries are medically incapable of work. The heart of the SSD program assumes
that the reduction of labor supply commonly induced by welfare programs cannot
occur among the totally disabled, and significant efforts are made in screening
applicants in an attempt to ensure that those who could work do not become
beneficiaries. Yet I shall show that even in the seemingly clear—cut case of
disability insurance, a social welfare program reduces labor supply. iligher
benefits cause men to drop out of the labor force and become SSD beneficiaries.1
This helps explain how LFPR can drop and SSD beneficiary roles can expand at a
tine when health care expenditures are increasing and men are moving out of physi-
cally demanding work.2
The following section will detail the growth of the SSD program and the
concurrent decline in LFPR. We shall also see what men who are out of the labor
force are living on and show the long—term nature of most non—participation.
In section II I develop the specification of a model of SSD beneficiary status.
Section III presents logistic regression results, applying this model to cross—
section data to forge the link between expected benefits and beneficiary status.
I also present time series regressions that show that the growth of the 5513
program has contributed to the decline in LFPR. In Section IV I examine and
reject a number of alternative explanations for the decline in LFPR, and present
evidence suggesting that the reduced LFPR caused by the disability insurance

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I. The Social Security Disability Program and Labor ForceParticipation.
Enacted into law in 1956, the SSD program wasdesigned to provide income
for the totally disabled, defined as those "unableto engage in substantial
gainful activity because of any medically determinable physicalor mental
impairment of long—continued and indefinite duration orexpected to result
in death." There have been two major liberalizations of theeligibility re-
quirement for SSD. In 1960 men below the age of 50 first becameeligible for
SSD benefits. In 1965 the definition of disabilitywas expanded to include
impairments expected to last for at least one year. At the sametime,
benefit levels have been increasing with the level of nominalearnings, and
have in addition been sporadically but persistently increasedby Congress.2
This double indexing, common to all Social Securityprograms, was formalized
in the 1972 amendments.
Throughout its existence the SSD program has providedaverage benefits for
a disabled worker, his wife, and two dependant children, equal to about 55%
of the average pre—tax earnings of production workers. Dueprimarily to double
indexing this replacement ratio has risen on average to 64% in 1975 andeven
higher for new recipients. To the extent that SSD recipients would earn less
than average, and since the relevant comparison is to after—taxearnings, the
replacement ratio is even more generous. However, since few 45 or 54—year old
men have eligible dependents we expect the typical replacement rate to be closer
to the 52% net of tax for a male worker alone. For a sample of disabled workers
allowed benefits in 1972 (Treitel, Table 5), 24.3% had annual benefitsgreater5
than 100% of pre—tax predisability earnings, and only 23.3% had a replacement
ratio below 50%.
SSD benefits are calculated in the same way as Social Security Retirement
benefits. This is a complex non—linear function of past earnings and family
composition.3 Applicants must have worked in SocialSecurity covered employment
in half of the previous forty quarters,4 must meet the disability standard
stated above, and must wait five months from the date of disability determination
before benefits are paid.5
Entrance into the program is administered at the State level. Since
the program is Federally funded, the States have little incentive to police entry
into the program or to review the current disability status of beneficiaries,
save that explicitly budgeted for by the Federal government. In recent years
there have been roughly equal numbers of denied and accepted applications for
SSD benefits.6 As the percent initially denied has risen recently, so has the
percent who appeal the initial denial. In 1973, 24% of those denied eligibility
at the initial medical determination were eventually enrolled through the appeals
process (Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, p. 3).
The outcome has been the explosive growth of the SSD program. By 1975
the program had expended to pay out 8.414 billion dollars with 1,750,000 disabled
worker beneficiaries. These included 6.22% of all non—white and 3.57% of all white
45— to 54—year old men.(See Appendix A for data on LFPR and the SSD program.)
By law a SSD recipient must be incapable of holding any job in the national
economy, so the SSD program will tend to lower LFPR as long as some beneficiaries
would otherwise be in the labor force. Beneficiaries are allowed trial work
periods, and were allowed to earn less than $140 per month in 1972, but these6
options are infrequently exercised. So most recipients are by law and in fact
out of the labor force. To prove that the SSD program has led to decreasing
LFPR we shall show that not all recipients would have been out of the labor
force in the absence of SS]D.
In effect, SSD recipients are permanently out of the labor force. "The
data show that very few of the older middle—aged workers left the rolls for
recovery of the ability to work in gainful employment. Essentially, the program
appears to function as an early retirement program for older middle—aged persons
with severe medical impairments."7 The termination rate is about 10% —only
3%through recovery, 7% throughdeath.8
Beforeproceeding, we can determine an upper bound on the proportion of
the decline in LFPR that can be attributed to the growth of the SSD program.
Ifall SSD beneficiaries would otherwise have been in the labor force, then at
most 66% of the 8.9 percentage point decline in non—white LFPR and 90% of the
3.7 percentage point decline in white LFPR form 1957 to 1975 could be attributed
directly to the SSD program. We shall actually be able to show that about 43%
of the decline in LFPR of 45 to 54—year old men is due to the growth of the
SSD program.
This may seem startling to those who view labor force non—participation
as a transient phenomenon, fluctuating with the number of discouraged workers
cast off during the downturn of the business cycle. The evidence points to a
different type of non—participation: hard—core long—term drop—outs. In 1976,
39.8% of the 45 to 54—year old white men who were out of the labor force had
been out of the labor force for more than five years. For non—whites the
corresponding number was 43.5% (Deutermann). In 1970 more than half the 45
to 54—year old men who were out of the labor force had not held a job for at7
least three years (u.s. Census 1970a, p. 706). For these men, being out of
thelabor force is not a temporary state. It is this long—term chronic
non—participation among a large and growing portion of the adult male population
thatisso troubling.
Whatdo these men live on? Table 1 shows that the major sources of income
for men who are out of the labor force are Social Security Disability benefits,
Veteran's Assistance payments, wife's earnings, and government employees pension
ordisability benefits.9 Of these, SSD is the largest source of income. In
197056% of SSD recipients had received benefits for more than 3 years, matching
thelong—term nature of most non—participation. Given the accelerating growth
ofthe program this is probably an underestimate of the length of completed spells
ofbeneficiary status.
The long—term nature of most non—participation is coupled with the fact
that the LFPR of 45 to 54—year old men has been declining at an accelerating
rate over the last 22 years, through all phases of the business cycle. Nost
men who are out of the labor force claim to be disabled, but it is difficult
to believe that between record health care expenditures and 051-IA an increasing
proportion of men are becoming and stayingdisabled.
Wehave shown that one—third of the men who are out of the labor force
are SSDbeneficiaries,and most of them have been out of the labor force for
years. SSD benefits have increased and eligibility has been expanded so that
the proportion of SSD beneficiaries has grown as LFPR declined. In the next
section we shall measure the increase in the probability of becoming an SSD
beneficiary as expected benefits increase relative to expected labor market
earnings,holding health characteristics fixed. using these estimates, we
shall project the increase in SSD beneficiaries and decrease in labor force
participants due to the liberalization of the SSD program.8
Table 1: Characteristics of Labor Force Non—participants and of Social Security
Disability Recipients, 1972.
Out of the Outof the
In the Labor Force Labor Force
Labor Force Non SSD Recipient SSD Recipient
Sample size 1646 210 217
% non—white .08 .19 .16
% married .89 .72 .82
% claiming total disability .005 .68 .96
%claiming partial disability .12 .16 .03
% receiving support from relatives .003 .03 .02
1971Family welfare from:
socialsecurity 48 182 1949
veteran's payments 108 432 754
gov.employee pension or dis. 127 470 171
priv. pension or disability 34 17 351
workman's compensation 8 32 143
unemployment compensation 46 162 42
private insurance 16 17 147
AB & APTD 1 70 96
AFDC 6 138 40
railroad retirement 1 12 5
state temporary disability 1 0 69
other 124 441 116
Totalwelfare 520 1973 3883
1971Family Income from:
own earnings 11259 1668 818
wife's earnings 2425 1599 1603
childrens' (<18) earnings 6 7 31
interest, dividends, rent 437 259 173
gifts 13 20 24
Total capital & labor income 14140 3553 2049
other family members'
earnings 926 841 708
welfare 75 557 162
Total 1971 Income 19544 6924 6802
net total assets 37067 13377 12811
assets liquidated & consumed 1971 312 402 352
1971 weeks worked 48 11 4
Note: Data derived from 1972 Survey of Health and Work Characteristics, weighted to
represent the 1970 non—institutionalized civilian population of 45 to 54—year
old men in the U.S.9
II. The Model
I shall deal with the following model, in which equation 3 is to be
estimated.
(1) SSDK =F(SSD,w, x)
(2) WZb+u
(3) SSDK =F(SSD,Zb + u, X)
where
SSDK =probabilityof being an SSD beneficiary.
SSD= expectedSocial SecurityDisability benefits
W=expectedlabor market income
X =avector of background characteristics, including marital status
Z =avector of background characteristics determining wage, including
past wage and excluding marital status.
Health and other background characteristics affect incomes and may enter
significantly into our final estimates if utility functions or discount rates
differ systematically across individuals. For example, the old or disabled may
have higher discount rates.
Our goal is to estimate the probability of being an SSD beneficiary as
a function of expected SSD benefits, expected labor market income, W, and back-
ground characteristicsX. The major econometric problem is that a large portion10
of our sample, in particular the SSD beneficiaries, is out of the labor force
and has no observable current wage. One might want to imputewages for this
group using a wage equation estimated for the sub—sample with observable
wages, and correcting for sample selection bias following llecSan. This
method requires estimating the probability of observing a positivewage, but
in our application this is nearly equivalent to estimating the probability
of not being an SSD beneficiary, which is what I am after in the first place.
This approach, which does not arise in the original Heckman application because
the probability of having an observable wage is not taken explicitly as a
function of the expected wage, would require maximum likelihood estimation
of a non—linear simultaneous system.
Since I am willing to leave the coefficient on W in the beneficiary
equation unidentified, I can avoid the simultaneity problem. As in indirect
least squares, we replace W by Zb + u as in equation 3. Note that the estimated
coefficient on an element of Z, say Z, that is also an element of the vector
X, will be the sum of the coefficient on Z. in equation 1 plus the product of
the coefficient on W in equation 1 times the coefficient on Z. in equation 2.
Expected SSD benefits are estimated as the product of de jure benefits
given eligibility, times the probability of being eligible for benefits. Using
a sample of recent applicants, we shall estimate the probability of eligibility
as a function of health and background characteristics. We shall assume no sample
selection bias in the eligibility equation. If applicants were more eligible
than non—applicants in ways not controlled for in our eligibility equation, then
the estimated coefficient on SSD would be biased toward zero in equation 312
Our data—set includes the respondents' claimed knowledge of a Social
Security program that pays disability benefits. We can take this knowledge as
either endogenous or exogenous. If we impute positive SSD benefits even to11
those who claim to be ignorant of the program, then equation 3 can be thought
of in two ways. Either we have made the restrictive assumption thateveryone
knows about the program, or, we are estimating the joint probability of knowing
about and applying for the program. Alternatively, if positive expected benefits
are imputed only for those who know of the program, then knowledge of the
program is taken as exogenous, and we have a classic control group with which
to test the effect of SSD benefits on labor force participation..
I use past wage to help infer current expected wage. My data set
includes the Social Security Earnings Record, which reports annual earnings up
to the maximum amount that is subject to Social Security taxes. I select
the most recent positive past annual earnings and correct for quarters worked
and inflation. The specification includes a binary independent variable set to
one if the past wage was at the taxable ceiling, to correct for the truncation
of this variable.
To correct for health and disability status I use a set of 27 binary
independent variables for specific health conditions, as detailed in Appendix
B.13 The coefficients for this vector of healthcoefficients in our estimated
eligibility and beneficiary equations are discussed in Appendix B.12
III. Regression Results
The Social Security Disability program has had a large and significant
effect in reducing labor supply. The elasticity of labor supply in response to
expected SSD benefits is found to be .35 in the results discussed below.
Estimation of the model supports our hypothesis thatlaborforce participation
falls because more men become SSD beneficiaries when expected SSD benefits
rise relative to wage income. In this section we first estimate the probability
of eligibility for SSD benefits, which will be used to impute expected benefits.
We then estimate the effect of increased benefits on the proportion of SSD
beneficiaries and labor—force drop—outs in the population, finding a significant
strong response with health characteristics and expected labor market income
controlled for.
We estimate the effect of the SSD program on LPPR in two steps. First
we estimate a cross—section logistic equation for the probability of being an
SSD beneficiary. Note that this cross—section is direct evidence of the
reduction in LFPR caused by the SSD program. If all SSD beneficiaries
would have been out of the labor force even in the absence of the SSD program,
it is unlikely that we would observe, as shown below, that the probability of
being a beneficiary is strongly responsive to expected incomes. In the second
step we use time—series regressions to explicitly estimate the number of labor—
force withdrawals caused by the increase in SSD beneficiaries. When we apply
the cross—section coefficients to changes in the variables over time, we can
explain half of the increase in the SSD beneficiary population and about
half of the decline in LFPR from 1957 to 1975. Separate time—series evidence
from regressions of LFPR on benefit levels, earnings, and cyclical indicators3-3
providesindependent support for large decline in LFPRcausedby the 5513
program.
The results below are based on an unweighted sample of 45 to 54— year
old men who were not last employed by the government. In general, government
employees are not covered by Social Security, so they have been eliminated from
the sample. The sample is drawn from the 1972 Social Security Survey of Health
and Work Characteristics, in which 18,000 persons were selected from the 1970
Census 5% sample and re—interviewed. It includes 11,7000 people who indicated
that they were disabled prior to 1969 on the 1970 Census questionnaire. A
1971 mail screening produced 5,100 non—disabled and 1,200 newly disabled
people. The sample is designed to represent the non—institutionalized civilian
population of the U.S. aged 18 to 64. This survey data is merged with beneficiary
dataform the Social Security Master Beneficiary Record File, and with earnings
history from the Social Security Earnings Record File.
The key variable, 5513 benefits, is :Lmputed in two steps.IDe jure
benefits are calculated as a deterministic function of past wagehistory and
number of dependents. The correlation between our calculation of de jure bene-
fits and actual benefits received by beneficiaries is .81, since we do not have
exact data on the date of disability determination. To impute expected SSD
benefits we multiply the calculated de jure benefits by the probability of
being eligible, which is estimated using a sample of recent applicants. Eli-
gibility for 5513 benefits is determined by State agencies in a subjective process
that takes account of age, education, occupation, and the degree of disability.
Legally, total disability expected to last at least one year is the prerequisite.
90% of the recipients in the sample report themselves totally disabled, as do
68% of the non—recipients who are out of the labor force. As our results (Table14
2) show, for a sample of 45 to 54—year old men who applied for SSD between
1966 and 1972, health condition is obviously a prime determinant of eligibility.
Another major factor is having established disability insurance coverage
by having worked the required number of quarters in Social Security coveted
employment. So far the provisions of the law seem to be borne out in actual
practice. According to the law race should not affect eligibility. That being
non—white significantly decreases eligibility is either evidence of sample
selection bias or measurement error, or else reflects the de facto application
of the law.
We find that a $180 increase in yearly benefits will increase the
proportion of SSD beneficiaries in the population by 1 percentage point.15
(See equation A, Table 3.) This is equivalent to an elasticity of .35, a
substantial response among men who are usually considered incapable of workingJ6
This specification can be interpreted as estimating the joint probability of
knowing about and applying for SSD benefits, and probably underestimates the
true response since we impute positive expected benefits to those who claim
to be ignorant of the program. The same 1 percentage point increase in the
proportion of beneficiaries is produced by a $105 increase in mean yearly
benefits when the sample is limited to those who claim to know of the SSD
program17 (equation B, Table 3). This corresponds to an elasticity of .44.
This estimate is unbiased if knowledge of the program is taken to be exogenous.
Spreading knowledge of the SSIJ program does not by itself seem to be a sufficient
explanation for the growth in the beneficiary rolls. Even when the sample is
limitedto those who know of the program, those with higher expected benefits
are more likely to be beneficiaries.15
Table 2: Probability of Being Eligible for Social SecurityDisability Benefits,
Conditional on Being a Recent Applicant
Logisti? Asymptotic
Variable Mean Coefficient Standard Error dP/dX
Married—spouse present .73 .49 .45 .12
Non-white .20 -1,64 .61 -.41
CVRD .81 4.44 1.32 1.11
Log of age 3.91 6.32 3.87 1.58
Log of years of schooling2.01 -.0006 .34 -.0001
Residence in a city .42 .66 .42 .16
Rheumatic fever .02 .77 1.34 .19
Heart attacks .21 1.00 .52 .25
Stroke .06 3.75 1.73 .94
Cancer .04 -.65 1.45 -.16
Kidney stones .26 -1.02 .47 -.25
Diabetes .13 1.74 .78 .43
Epilepsy •Q3 3.60 1.97 .90
Multiple sclerosis .01 2.04 2.60 .51
Alcohol or drug problem .02 -5.49 7.79 -1.37
Hernia .03 -1.63 1.00 -.41
Deafness .07 -1.36 .75 -.34
Blindness .13 -.06 .58 -.01
Stiffness or deformity .21 -.29 .48 .07
Back trouble .26 2.18 .61 .54
Back stiffness .10 -1.84 .70 -.46
Respiratory conditions .27 .72 .46 .18
Allergies .10 1.14 .70 .28
Circulatory conditions .28 -.39 .47 -.10
Cardiovascular conditions .27 .09 .45 .02
Tumors, neoplasms .04 -1.35 .88 -.34
Digestive conditions .23 -.77 .48 -.19
Urogenital conditions .10 1.03 .80 .26
Mental illness .06 1.77 .96 .44
Nervous disorders .20 1.04 .56 .26
Other .16 -1.59 .62 —.40
Constant -29.41 15.48
Mean of dependent variable .52
N 252.
-2 log likelihood ratio 23.5
Note: CVRD =coveredfor SSD insurance.Table 3:Probability of Being A Social Security Disability Beneficiary
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Note: Both equations include the vector of health characteristics.
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
In equation B the sample is limited to those who claim knowledge of the
SSD program.
Interaction term =dummyfor past wage at ceiling times log of past wage.17
Similarly, the more one expects to be able to earn the less likely
one is to be a beneficiary. As past wage reaches the ceiling on Social
Security taxable earnings, the probability of being a beneficiary approximates
zero. The elasticity-of beneficiary status with respect to havingwages
that surpass the ceiling is —19.4. Below the ceiling the probability of
becoming a beneficiary drops by 1 percentage point with a 12% increase in the
levelof past monthly wages. The sharply decreased probability ofbecoming a bene-
ficiary when past wages are at or above the ceiling nay reflect the fact that
a disabled white—collar worker can often continue working while an identically
disabled blue—collar worker cannot due to the physical demands of the job. The
negative coefficient on years of schooling is taken as further evidence of the
same effect.
Note that the color of one's skin makes little difference. We find a
higher proportion of black than white males in the SSD program, not because
blacks have a greater predilection for this program, but rather because blacks
face poorer job opportunities and are in poorer health. If the economicposi—
tion of blacks comes into line with that of whites, we expect equal proportions
of blacks and whites to be beneficiaries.
These results indicate that the growth in the proportion of SSD beneficiaries
among prime age males has been due to the liberalization of eligibility require-
ments, and to the increase in benefit levels relative to potential earnings.
Declining job opportunities seem to be a plausible explanation for the program's18
accelerating growth during the 1970's, but not for the 1960's. Given the
increases in real incomes and real per—capita health expenditures it seems
implausible to attribute the increasing proportion of beneficiaries in a
given age group to deteriorating health.
Dothese estimated cross—section responses correspond tothe observed
changesover time? We find that we can account for half of the increase in
theproportion of SSD beneficiaries by applying the cross—section coefficients
from equation A to t:ine—series data. We shall show that this in turn can
explain about half of the decline in LFPR, using t:ine—series regression.
Between 1957 and 1975 the average monthly benefit of new 45 to 54—year old
beneficiaries rose from $94 to $148 in real 1972 dollars. The real average
monthly earnings of production workers increased from $374 to $437 during
the same period. The percentage of all male workers with annual earnings
below the taxable ceiling fell form 41.3 to 23.8. Over this period there
have been seven jumps in the ceiling, so the annual percentage above the
ceiling has not dropped smoothly. Changes in other variables have been negli-
gible. For example, the percentage married—spouse—present inched up from
83.9 to 84.3.
Multiplying the changes over time in wages and benefits by the estimated
coefficients from equation A we find an implied 1.8 percentage point increase
in beneficiaries, more than half of the historical 3.5 percentage point increase
for men of both races)8 Since more men are below the taxable ceiling because
the ceiling has been raised, and not because these men are earning less in
the sense of the cross—section regression, we have left this factor aside.
Most of the action is beneath the ceiling in any case.19
Overtime increases in beneficiaries have been matched more than one for
one by decreases in labor force participants. In time—series regressions of
LFFR on the proportion of recipients (REC) and cyclical indicators (eq. 1—6,
Table 4), we observe LFPR to drop by at least one point when REC increases
by one point. We would be unlikely to observe this relation if all beneficiaries
would have been out of the labor force even in the absence of the SSD program.
Since we previously found a 1.8 percentage point increase in beneficiaries
applyingcross—section coefficients to time—series changes, and that LFPR
drops by more than 1 point when the percentage of SSD beneficiaries increases
by1 point, our results imply at least a 1.8 percentage point decrease in
LFPR. The actual decline from 1957 to 1975 was 4.2 points for men of all races,
so we conclude that the growth of expected benefits relative to potential
earnings can explain nearly half of the puzzling decline in LFPR.
In a separate set of time—series regressions of LFPR on average SSD
benefit levels and average earnings (eqs. 7—12, Table 4) we see evidence
consistent with our cross—section findings of a large effect of benefit levels
on LFPR. Even when the business cycle, trend, median earnings, and trend since
1960 when the eligibility rules changed, are controlled for, the SSD benefit
levels still significantly contribute to the decline in LFPR. With earnings
controlled for, the business cycle does not strongly or significantly affect
LFPR. These time—series results indicate that a $100 increase in average
real SSD benefits will reduce non—white LPPR by 4 percentage points and white
LFPR by 3 percentage points.20
Table 4: Time Series Regressions of Labor Force Participation Rates, 1957—1975.
—2
Race Rec Avben Earn Cycle T54 ThU Constant Rho/D.W.R
1 White —1.4 — — —.001 — — 98.2 .86/ — .97
(.28) (.002) (.12)
2 —1.5 — — —0.8 — — 98.4 .88/ — .97
(.29) (.04) (.11)
3 —1.5 — —.03 98.2 .86/ — .97
(.29) (.04) (.12)
4 Non—white —1.9 — — .019 96.7 .37/ — .89
(.27) (.01) (.22)
5 —1.6 — .16 95.6 .38/ — .87
(.24) (.30) (.22)
6 —1.6 — — —.58 98.3 —.17/— .90
(.11) (.14) (.23)
7 White — —.028 .11 —.006 —.28 .08 90.3 —/1.7 .98
(.0005) (.03) (.003) (.16) (.15)
8 — —.026 .10 —.19 —.27 .05 91.2 —/1.8 .98
(.004) (.02) (.06) (.11)(.11)
9 — —.036 .11 .14 —.21 .001 90.1 —/2.0 .98
(.006)(.03) (.07) (.13)(.12)
10 Non—white— —.047 .005 .019 .29 —.77 96.9 —/2.8 .95
(.02) (.11) (.01) (.57)(.53)
11 — —.044 .16 —.009 —.39—.14 85.6 —/2.4 .94
(.02) (.09) (.27) (.53)(.48)
12 — —.044 .16 —.0006—.38—.15 85.7 —/2.5 .94
(.02) (.12) (.27) (.52)(.47)
Variable Definitions:
EEC percentage of 45—54 year old men who are SSD beneficiaries, eqs. 1—3, 7—9: white,
eqs. 4—6, 10—12: non—white.
AVEEN average real monthly SSD benefits of 45—54 year old male beneficiaries, exclusive
of dependents' benefits.
EARN average real monthly earnings of production workers.
T54 Time, starting in 1954
T60 Time, starting in 1960
CYCLE a business cycle indicator, defined as follows:
eqs. 1,4,7,10: deviation of real GNP from trend, the residual from
GNP=39l+28 .8*TI
eqs. 2,5,8,11: deviation of the employment population ratio of all
males from trend, the residual from EMPR=77— .26*TIME
eqs. 3,6,9,12: unemployment rate for all males21
Since it is difficult to separate out the effects of the SSDprogram
from othermacro—economic factors in a set of 22 observations, the time—series
results should only be considered suggestive of the magnitude of the effect
of the SSD program on LFPR. While future research may find smaller effects,
it is unlikely to overturn the basic result that the growth of the SSD
program has caused a significant part of the decline in LFPR.22
PT. Alternative Explanations
We haveshown that the growth of the Social Security Disability
programhas been the major factor behind the decline in LFPR over thepast
twenty years. In this section we shall examine and dismiss three alternative
explanations of the decline in LFPR. 1) Thedeclineis due to the dissolution
of the American family. 2) Nale LFPR declined because female LFPR increased.
3)Thedecline is the product of past economic dislocations.
Thefirst argument is that since single men commonly have lower LFPR, the
break—up of the family could account for the reduction in aggregate LFPR. The
premisethat fewer men are with spouses in this age group is false. For 45
to 54—year old non—white men, the proportion married spouse—present has remained
a steady 71% in every census since 1940. For both races it has increased from
.78 in 1940 to .84 in 1970. Using more recent CPSsurvey data for 1964 to
1975, changes in the marital status of 45 to 54—year old non—white males, which
itself shows no strong trend, can account for at most 16% of the variance in
LFPR.
If the decline in male LFPR is not due to the weakness of the family,
perhaps it is due to the strength of the family. If more women are entering
the labor force, perhaps their husbands can afford to take longer vacations by
dropping out. Once again the premise is incorrect. Among both married and
unmarried non—white 45 to 54—year old women LFPR declined from 1965 to 1974
(U.S. BL.S). In regressions using the 1966 National Longitudinal Survey, wife's
income hadnosignificant effect on husband's LFFR.23
Perhaps the decline in LFPR we observe today is not the product of
current forces, but rather the fruit of seeds sown long ago. If the mature
man of today was unemployed as a youth, might not the permanent scars reduce
current LFPR? If so we would expect this cohort to have had low LFPR over
its entire life—cycle. Decennial Census data shows this is not true. The 50—
to 54—year olds of 1970 were the 40 to 44—year olds of 1960, and had a LFPR
of 89.9%. This is only 1.2 percentage points less then the LFPR of 40 to
44—year olds in 1950, and only 1.8 percentage points less than the LFPR of 40
to 44—year olds in 1940. The problem is not one of a peculiar cohort that has
always had a weak attachment to the labor force. The drops in LPPR have
occurred across a number of age groups, primarily in the last twenty years.
This suggests that a more recent event is at the source of our current
problems, perhaps a great occupational or industrial shift like the black exodus
from Southern farm to Northern factory. Such a dislocation could also reduce
LFPR because the grey area between working and not working is more sharply de-
fined once off the family farm. Only 2% of the non—white cohort aged 55 to
64 in 1970 were employed as farmers in 1970 (U.S. Census 1970b, Table 4 ).5.6%
of the same cohort were farmers in 1960, and 12.7% in 1950 (U.S. Census 1960,
Table 7). Over the same period this cohort has moved into crafts and service
work and out of non—manufacturing labor. But we have already seen that this
cohort had fairly typical LFPR in 1960. The changes in occupational and
industrial distribution since 1960 out of unskilled physical labor and into
crafts and services do not seem large enough to have "shocked" many men out
of the labor force.24
The phenomenon of a falling LFPR in response to a disability insurance
program does not appear to be unique to the 13.5. In Canada, the LPPR of
45 to 54—year old men has fallen 2.3 percentage points in the past 7 years
(Statistics Canada, 1972—1979), following the inclusion of disability insurance
in the Canada and Quebec Pension plans in 1970.19 Perhaps the most outstanding
example of this sort is in the Netherlands, where disability insurance has
reached crisis proportions. By 1977, 23% of all insured 50 to 54—year olds,
31% of the 55 to 59—year olds, and 42% of the 60 to 64—year olds were bene-
ficiaries of the Dutch Disability Security Act (Hans Emanuel, p. lO).20
Social insurance programs for disability seem to have reduced LPPR among
prime age males in the Netherlands and Canada, as well as in the U.S. Other
explanations of the decline in LFPR in the U.S. do not appear to be consistent
with the data.25
V. Conclusion
The labor force participation rates of primeage males have been decreasing
since 1957 in response to the growth in the number of SocialSecurity Disability
beneficiaries. We have shown that the increase in SSD benefits relativeto
earnings can explain roughly half of the increase in beneficiaries and decrease
in labor force participants. The SSD program has acted as anescape hatch out
of the labor force for disabled men. The more generous the benefits and the
poorer labor market conditions, the more attractive the escape hatch. Reducing
unemployment, improving rehabilition efforts among the partially disabled, and
recent legislation to extend Social Security hospital insurance and supplemental
medical insurance to the disabled in the labor force would all be humaneways
of helping these men to continue productive lives. We are left with the disturb-
ing question: why are so many men in a position where the Social Security
Disability program is an appealing alternative?26
Appendix A: The Growth of the Social Security Disability Program
AndtheDecline in Labor Force Participation
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) _½)
1957 0.32 0.26 —— 57 93.5 96.6
1958 0.50 0.39 165.50 249 93.9 96.6
1959 0.79 0.56 188.30 457 92.8 96.3
1960 1.18 0.72 192.20 568 92.3 96.1
1961 1.87 1.06 193.80 887 92.3 95.9
1962 2.38 1.26 194.70 1105 92.2 96.0
1963 2.71 1.43 196.10 1210 91.1 96.2
1964 2.88 1.52 197.10 1309 91.6 96.1
1965 3.16 1.66 216.30 1573 92.0 95.9
1966 3.47 1.83 217.80 1781 90.7 95.8
1967 3.74 1.96 217.30 1939 91.3 95.6
1968 3.96 2.09 242.00 2294 90.1 95.4
1969 4.12 2.20 241.30 2542 89.5 95.1
1970 4.38 2.33 273.20 3067 88.2 94.9
1971 4.79 2.55 296.70 3758 86.9 94.7
1972 5.22 2.81 362.80 4473 86.1 94.0
1973 5.57 3.04 367.20 5718 88.0 93.5
1974 5.72 3.27 411.30 6903 84.7 93.0
1975 6.22 3.57 454.00 8414 84.6 92.9
1. % of 45 to 54—year old non—white men who are 5513 recipients.
2. % of 45 to 54—year old white men who are SSD recipients.
3. Average monthlySSDbenefit, male worker, wife, and twooremore dependent children.
4. Total disability benefits paid out, million $.
5.Labor Force Participation Rate, non—white males aged 45—54.
6. Labor Force Participation Rate, white males aged 45—54.
Source: Social Security data derived from Social Security Bulletin, Annual
Statistical Supplement. Earnings and LFPR data from Manpower
and Training Report of the President.27
Appendix B: The Health Condition Vector, Coding and Results.
The coefficients on the vector of health conditions from equation A are
generally sensible. The most disabling condition, multiple schlerosis, increases
the probability of beneficiary status by 34 percentage points. Since eligibility
benefits has already been allowed for, the coefficients presented below as well as
on all variables that enter the structural wage equation, reflect the effect on
beneficiary status directly as well as indirectly through the prospective wage.
Equation A
Logistic Asymptotic
Variable Mean Coefficent Standard Error
Rheumatic fever .012 —.64
Heart attacks .091 1.01 .18
Stroke .017 .58 .30
Cancer .013 .81 .40
Arthritis .213 .20 .15
Diabetes .059 .61 .21
Epilepsy .018 1.28 .32
Multiple sclerosis .008 3.04 .48
Alcohol or drug problem .017 1.77 .51
Hernia .039 —.30 .36
Deafness .064 .51 .24
Blindness .049 1.09 .20
Stiffness or deformity .118 .75 .17
Back trouble .202 .29 .15
Stiffness in back .065 1.22 .23
Respiratory conditions .144 .45 - .15
Allergies .088 .13 .21
Circulatory conditions .174 .10 .15
Cardiovascular conditions .119 1.23 .16
Tumors .030 .51 .28
Digestive conditions .143 .23 .16
Urogenital conditions .047 .33 .23
Mental illness .027 1.58 .24
Nervous disorders .102 .73 .15
Other .160 .07 .1828
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1. I shall not deal with the issue of whether part of the growth of the SSD
beneficiary roles is fraudulent. Given the law that is essentially a medical
issue on which ihaveneither the data nor the skill to judge. This
paperdoes suggest that it is difficult to determine whether a person is
totally disabled.
2.A more equitable indexing system would deflate earnings before computing
average monthly earnings, then index benefits to correct for inflation.
Since the present system calculates benefits based on nominal earnings it
tends to benefit beneficiaries with more recent, highly inflated earnings.
3. Between January, 1971 and September, 1972, the primary insurance amount
(PIA) was equal to 90.01% of the first $110 of the average monthly wage plus
32.74% of the next $290, plus 30.59% of the next $150 plus 35.96% of the
next$100 plus 20% of the next $100. Balf of the PIA is added for each eli-
gible dependent, subject to certain individual and family minimums and
maximums.
4.There are special eligibility requirements for the blind and those younger
than31.
5.The date of disability determination may precede the date of application
for benefits, so benefits nay be paid sooner than 5 months after applications.
Conversations with the Social Security Administration indicated that in
1979 the shortest wait would probably be 77 days, the average processing time.31
6.In 1970, the leading primary diagnoses among 40 to 49—year old malenew
beneficiaries were chronic ischemic heart disease —16.2%,schizophrenia —
8.1%,slipped disc —6.4%,tuberculosis —3.4%,and emphysema —2.5%.
(See Lerner, p. 27.)
7.(See Treitel, p. 11.) lIe also notes the curious fact that therecovery
rate among SSD recipients has not increased even though theaverage age has
declined. He finds in a logit regression that high ratios of benefits to
predisability earnings significantly reduces the probability of recovery,
holding health, occupation and other background variables constant.
8. These termination rates are derived from 1972 data in SocialSecurity
Bulletin, Tables 67 and 108.
9..In cross—section regressions, veteran status increases the probability
of being out of the labor force. The percentage of veterans among 45
to 54—year olds has been declining since the l960's as the bulk of World War
II veteranspassed through this age group. It should also be noted that
bothGovernmentemployees' disability and private disability insurance
programs reported unusual growth during the 1970's, contributing to the
decline in LFPR.
10. We assume a discount rate sufficiently high that current income is a sufficient
indicator of the present value of a stream of income. Note that it is
probably not in the worker's interest to delay entrance into the SSD program.
if he is eligible. The average 45 to 49—year old new beneficiary in late
1972 bad benefits of $201 per month, which corresponds to average yearly
earnings of $3828. Assuming that the worker had static expectations on the
benefit computation law, he would have to increase his average yearly earnings
by 16% if he worked another year in order to increase his benefits by 10%.
Of course, to increase average yearly earnings by this much earnings in the
additional year he would have to increase by much more than 16% over the
previous year; an unlikely prospect.32
11. The missing data problem could be dealt with and the coefficienton expected
wage identified using maximum likelihood techniques as outlined in Criliches,
Hall and Hausman, but these methods are quite expensive in thisapplication.
12. We underestimate the true effect of SSD benefits. Forexample, consider
two men, Smith and Jones, with identical reported characteristics but
different true levels of disability. Assume only Jones, who ismore
disabled in ways the Social Security Administration can observe but which
are not recorded in our data, applies for SSD benefits. We use only the
reported characteristics to infer Smith's eligibility; so we will overestimate
it. Since expected benefits are simply benefits conditional oneligibility
times the probability of eligibility, we also overestimate expected SSD
benefits among non—applicants, biasing the coefficient toward zero.
13. Our data—set includes self—reported disability status. We prefer touse the
detailed health questions because they invite less self—justificationon
the part of those men out of the labor force. We did notuse the health
vectorto form instrumental variables for disability status in the implicit
structural wage equation because of the nature of our reduced form estimation
procedure.
14.The estimated coefficients are the B from the logistic equation
p =l/(l+exp(—B)).
15. dp/dxB(p)(l—p) in the logistic model: ln(p/1—p)=xB, where p is the mean
probability of being a beneficiary. The elasticity is equal to B(l—p)
since benefits are measured in logs. Since the logistic function
is non—linear, all elasticities are calculated holding the mean values of
other variables constant, and using mean probabilities.33
16.It is unlikely that the estimated relation between high SSD benefits and
the probability of being a beneficiary is just a spurious correlation. When
the sample is l:Lmited to those who do not know of the program, the coefficient
becomes weaker and less significant. S:imilarly, high SSD benefits increase
the probability of being out of the labor force in cross—section estimates,
but the coefficient becomes weak and insignificant when SSD beneficiaries
are eliminated from the sample. If all SSD beneficiaries would have been
out of the labor force in the absence of the SSD program it is unlikely that
we would observe that the probability of being out of the labor force
increases with SSD benefits, and that higher expected earnings decrease the
probability of being a beneficiary.
17. In other regressions it appears that the effect of higher expected benefits
works mostly through the changes in expected eligibility.
18. The calculation is: A% beneficiaries=.1131*(.40*ALss2_.58*aws), where LSS2
increased from 4.52 to 5.07 and LW5 increased from 5.98 to 6.08.
19. Decennial census data, though not strictly comparable, shows only a 1.6
percentage point drop for this same group from 1961 to 1971.
20. Though Dutch disability beneficiaries need not withdraw totally from the
labor force, most of the older ones do. In 1977, the LFPR for men aged
60 to 64 was 58.0, a drop of 13.9 percentage points from only 6 years earlier.
55 to 59—year olds dropped 7 points to 79.9 and 50 and 54—year olds dropped
4.8 points to 87.8 (I.L.0.).